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Abstract 
Secure one-to-many multicasting has been a popular re- 
search area in the recent past. Secure many-to-many mul- 
ticasting is becoming popular with applications such as 
private conferencing and distributed interactive simulation. 
Most of the existing secure multicasting protocols use a cen- 
tralized group manager to enforce access control and for  
key distribution. In the presence of multiple senders it is de- 
sirable to delegate group management responsibility to all 
the senders. We propose a distributed group key manage- 
ment scheme to support secure many-to-many communica- 
tion. We divide key distribution overhead evenly among the 
senders. Our protocol is scalable and places equal trust in 
all the senders. 
1. Introduction 
Secure multicasting in the Internet has several applica- 
tions such as stock quote distribution, private conferencing 
and distributed interactive simulation. Some of these ap- 
plications have a single sender distributing secret data to a 
large number of users while the others have a large number 
of users communicating privately with each other. Several 
protocols [ l ,  2 ,4 ,3 ,8 ,  10, 11,121 have been proposed in the 
recent past to support group communication between one 
sender and several members. Most of them use a centralized 
entity for group management. In the presence of multiple 
senders, distributed group management is desirable. Exist- 
ing solutions advocate distributed group management, but 
delegate key distribution overhead unevenly [9, 101. We 
present a scalable group key management scheme for se- 
0-7695-0722-O/OO $10.00 0 2000 IEEE 
cure many-to-many communication that distributes over- 
head evenly among the members of a multicast group. 
Although it presents a single point of attack and failure, 
using a centralized entity for group management is natural 
for one-to-many secure multicasting. However, in the pres- 
ence of multiple senders, it is desirable that the multicast 
group be operational as long as at least one sender is oper- 
ational. In other words, many-to-many secure multicasting 
calls for decentralized control of the group. Key distribution 
and dynamic group management tasks must be delegated to 
all the senders. It is desirable to evenly distribute protocol 
processing overhead among all the senders in the group. 
Only a few distributed group management protocols for 
scalable secure many-to-many communication exist in the 
literature [8, 9, 101. Iolus [SI can support for multiple 
senders. However, it exposes secret keys to third party en- 
tities which assist in key distribution and it also uses a cen- 
tralized “group security controller (GSC)” for group man- 
agement. The distributed flat key management (DFKM) 
scheme presented by Waldvogel et. al [ 101 suggests the idea 
of placing equal trust in all the group members. Members 
joining early generate the keys and distribute them to the 
members joining late. While DFKM works in principle, it 
is susceptible to collusions. It is also possible to have a very 
small subset of members controlling the group in DFKM, 
allowing uneven distribution of group control and key distri- 
bution overhead. Rodeh et. a1 [9] also advocate distributed 
group management for efficiency. However, their protocol 
assigns group control and management to a subset of the 
members rather than to all of them. 
We present DISEC, a distributed framework for scalable 
secure many-to-many communication. In this paper, we de- 
693 
Authorized licensed use limited to: University of Nebraska - Lincoln. Downloaded on March 11,2010 at 21:06:54 EST from IEEE Xplore.  Restrictions apply. 
scribe the key distribution mechanism in DISEC. We as- 
sign binary IDS to members and define a key association 
for each member based on its ID. Members forward secret 
keys through their key association groups during rekeying. 
Prospective members may contact any active member to 
join the group. Active members verify new members’ cre- 
dentials and assign them a unique ID. The ID assignment is 
done locally without any need to lookup a global space of 
IDS. The ID assignment process illustrates the distributed 
nature of our protocol. The new member initiates the rekey- 
ing process. Note that rekeying is done to ensure perfect 
forward secrecy [7]. When a member leaves, its neigh- 
bor (neighbor of a member is also determined based on the 
member’s ID) notices the departure and initiate the rekey- 
ing process. Key associations help delegate key distribution 
overhead evenly among all the members of the group. 
We use a virtual binary key distribution tree to better ex- 
plain our scheme. The leaves of the tree represent members 
of a multicast group. Each member generates a unique se- 
cret key for itself. Each internal node key is a function of the 
secret keys of its two children. All secret keys are associ- 
ated with their blinded versions, which are computed using 
a one-way function [l,  5 ,  61. Each member holds all the 
unblinded keys of nodes that are in its path to the root and 
the blinded keys of nodes that are siblings of the nodes in 
its path to the root. Contribution of a unique secret toward 
the computation of the root key gives each member partial 
control over the group. A joidleave requires only the keys 
in the path to the root from the joining/departing host to be 
changed. Thus, each membership change necessitates only 
O(1ogn) messages where n is the number of members in the 
group. Thus our protocol is scalable as well. 
Sec- 
tion 2 provides a description of DISEC. Section 3 compares 
DISEC to existing secure multicast protocols that support 
multiple senders. We list our conclusions in Section 4. 
We organize the rest of the paper as follows. 
2. A dissection of DISEC 
We propose a distributed group key management scheme 
for scalable secure many-to-many communication. All of 
the members are senders. Therefore, in the rest of this 
discussion, we use the terms members and senders inter- 
changeably. DISEC delegates group control responsibilities 
and key distribution tasks evenly to all the members. Our 
protocol is scalable and it trusts all members equally. In the 
following, we concentrate on the key distribution mecha- 
nism of DISEC. Details of group access control are out of 
the scope of this paper. 
For better explanation of our protocol, we represent the 
members of a multicast group by leaf nodes of a virtual bi- 
nary key distribution tree (see Figure’ 1). The key distri- 
I!-? is the blinded counterpart of the secret key, k .  
bution tree is strictly binary, i.e., each internal node has ex- 
actly two children. Each member generates a unique secret 
key which is the member’s contribution towards the gener- 
ation of the internal node keys including the root key. Inter- 
nal nodes represent secret keys and they are computed as a 
function of their children’s keys. The root key is computed 
similarly and is used for data encryption. For each secret 
key there is a blinded version, which is computed by apply- 
ing a given one-way function [ 1,5]  to the secret key. Given 
a blinded key, it is computationally infeasible to compute its 
unblinded counterpart. Each member knows all the keys of 
the nodes in its path to the root of the tree and the blinded 
keys of siblings of the nodes in its path to the root of the tree 
and no other blinded or unblinded keys [l]. The blinded 
keys are distributed by members that are owners and autho- 
rized distributors of those keys. Each member computes the 
unblinded keys of the internal nodes of the tree in its path to 
the root and the root key itself, using the blinded keys it re- 
ceives and its own secret key. We use a mixing function [ 13 
to compute internal node keys from the blinded keys of the 
node’s children. 
The limited distribution of unblinded and blinded keys 
is to ensure that DISEC is immune to collusions. It can be 
proven that no proper subset of the senders can gain access 
to all the keys in the multicast group. Collusion analysis 
and proof are out of the scope of this paper. 
I , Root Key = m( KO. k‘, ) n 
Figure 1. An example key distribution tree: we 
use a one-way function to compute k’ from k 
and m is a mixing function. 
Each member has a binary ID and is responsible for 
generating a secret key. It also computes the blinded ver- 
sion of its key and shares it with its immediate neighbor in 
the key distribution tree. The FindNeighborO algorithm2 
(Algorithm 1) takes a binary ID X = bhbh-1.. . bl,  where 
bi, 1 5 i 5 h is a binary digit, as its input and returns the 
binary ID of X’s neighbor, X ’ .  
*We use several simple functions in the algorithms presented in this 
paper. They are self explanatory. 
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Following Algorithm 1, H( 11 10)’s neighbor is I( 1 11 l), 
and G( 1 10)’s neighbor is H( 1 1 10) in Figure 1. Neighbors 
with IDS of same length (H and I in Figure 1) are referred to 
as immediate neighbors and they exchange blinded versions 
of their secret keys with each other. If a pair of neighbors 
have different ID lengths (G and H in Figure l), the member 
with the smaller ID size, sends the blinded version of its 
secret key and receives the blinded key of the corresponding 
internal node of same ID length from the member with the 
larger ID length (G receives k’, from H). Using the new 
keys received, the members compute their parent’s secret 
key. We use a mixing function (typically XOR function) [ 11 
to compute internal node keys. For example in Figure 1, C 
and D apply the mixing function m, to the blinded keys kb 
and kb, I to compute the internal node key kol . 
, end 
Algorithm 1: Discovering the neighbor 
Find_Neighbor(X = bhbh-I . . . bl) 
begin - 
XI= bhbh-1 ... bl; 
if (leaf-node(X’) == “true”) 
else if (internal-node(X’) == “true”) 
return X’; 
do 
while (leaf-node(X’) == “false”); 
return X‘; 
X’ = X’O; 
end 
2.1. Key association groups 
Algorithm 2: Finding members of a key association group 
Find-KeyAssociation(X = bhbh-1.. . bl, i) 
begin 
Xi = bhbh-1.. . bi+l&bi-l . . . b2bl; 
_. ki = kbhhh-l...bi+lbi’ 
if (leafxode(Xi) == “true”) 
else if (internal-node(Xi) == “true”) 
return (Xi, ki) ; 
do 
xi = xio; 
while (leaf-node(Xi) == “false”); 
return (Xi, kj) ; 
do 
while (leafxode(Xi) == “false”); 
return(Xi,ki); 
else 
Xi = right-shift(Xi,l)); 
To help delegate the task of key distribution evenly 
among all the members, we define key association groups. 
Members of a key association group exchange keys in 
DISEC. Each member needs as many blinded keys as the 
length of its ID, to compute the root key. For each bit posi- 
tion in a member’s ID, there exists a member that supplies 
the corresponding blinded key. We call the set of members 
that supplies blinded keys to a member, a key association 
group. The Find-Key AssociationO algorithm returns the 
ID of the member and the secret key it supplies, correspond- 
ing to a given bit position in a member’s ID. 
We illustrate the key association algorithm applied to 
H( 1 1 10) in Figure 1. Complementing the corresponding 
bit positions 1, 2, 3 and 4, we get I (1 11 l), 1100, 1010, 
01 10. Since nodes with the last three IDS do not exist, we 
right-shift them by one bit position to get G(l lo), F(101) 
and D(011) as the rest of the members in H’s key associa- 
tion group. I, G, F and D supply the keys k’, k’, kio, kb 
respectively, to H. 
Next, we demonstrate the root key computation process 
for C(O10). First, C generates the key kola and sends its 
blinded version kb,o (computed using the given one-way 
function) to D(011). Similarly, D sends kblI to C. Both C 
and D can then individually compute kol by applying the 
given mixing function to kblo and kb, Next, C sends kb, to 
A(000) and receives kb, in return. After the key exchange, 
both A and C can compute ko. After this step, C and G 
exchange kb and k’, with each other. We compute the root 
key from the keys kb and k;. Following similar steps, each 
member of the multicast group acquires or computes kb and 
k; and then computes the root key. Note that C receives 
only the blinded keys of the siblings of the nodes in its path 
to the root. Using those keys, it can compute the unblinded 
keys of the nodes in its path to the root. 
2.2. Join protocol 
f-4 Root Key 
Figure 2. Join protocol 
A prospective member may join at any node of the key 
distribution tree. It is desirable to keep the key tree bal- 
anced for efficiency. However, that is only possible if one 
or more entities keep a snap shot of key distribution tree. To 
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keep track of all members of the group and their positions 
in the key tree, we need either member status report mes- 
sages broadcast to the whole group or a centralized entity 
that keeps track of all joins and leaves. The first approach 
creates excessive network traffic and the second has a single 
point of failure. Our protocol attempts to locally balance the 
tree by choosing members in the tree that are within an ad- 
ministratively or Time-to-Live (TTL) scoped area, during 
joins. Prospective members join at a local member of the 
multicast group with the smallest ID length. 
Algorithm 3: Joining the multicast group 
Join(X, Y = bhbh-1. . . bl)  /* Y is the existing member */ 
begin 
Y = bhbh-1.. .b10; 
x = bhbh-1 . . . bl1; 
k, = generatenewkey(); 
i =  1; 
while ( i  5 length(X)) 
begin 
(M, d) = Find-KeyAssociation(X, i ) ;  
sendkeyfrom-to(outgoingkey, X, M); 
scoped-securemulticast(outgoingkey, M, IC); 
sendkeyfrom-to(d, M, X); 
i =  i+  I ;  
Outgoingkey = kiight-shift(x,i- 1); 
krightshift(x,i- 1) = m(outgoingkey, d); 
end 
end 
In Figure 2, J is a new member which joins at C. To 
include J into the group, C splits its ID 010 (shown in 
Figure I), keeps 0100 for itself and assigns 0101 to J. C 
also changes its secret key and sends the blinded version 
of its new key to J. J generates a secret key of its own and 
transmits the blinded version to C. Note that all keys corre- 
sponding to the internal nodes in the path to the root from 
J, change due to the join. J needs all the unblinded keys 
of the nodes shown in black and the blinded keys of the 
nodes show in gray, in Figure 2. Notice that none of the 
blinded keys known to C have changed and thus it can com- 
pute all the new keys corresponding to nodes 010, 01 and 
0 and the root key once it receives k[I. Now J needs the 
blinded keys corresponding to 01 1, 00 and 1. Using the 
Find-KeyAssociation() algorithm presented earlier, it de- 
termines that nodes with IDS Oll(D), 000(A) and llO(G) 
are the members of its key association group. Note that 
these nodes and their neighbors also need the blinded keys 
that J knows or can compute. To elaborate, J sends kb,, to 
D and receives kb, , from D. It then computes kb, and sends 
it to A and receives kb in return. A is also required to lo- 
cally multicast kb, encrypted with kw, which can only be 
decrypted by A and B. J can now compute kb which it sends 
to G ,  receives k’, in return and computes the root key for 
itself. G multicasts kb encrypted with k l ,  to be decrypted 
by E, F, G, H and I only. After the above key exchanges all 
authorized members will have the keys they need to com- 
pute the new root key. In all, there will be O(1ogn) unicast 
messages and O(1og n)  subgroup multicast messages during 
a join. Note that the multicast messages will be limited to 
a TTL-scoped or administratively scoped region, since they 
only need to be sent to selected subgroups within the multi- 
cast group. We generalize the join process in Algorithm 3. 
It takes the new member and an existing member’s ID as 
arguments. In the algorithm, K‘ indicates the key sent by M 
to x. 
2.3. Leave protocol 
When a member leaves, its neighbor initiates the rekey- 
ing process. If the neighbor is the departing member’s sib- 
ling, it assumes its parent’s position in the key distribution 
tree. Otherwise it notifies the descendants of the departing 
member’s sibling to change their IDS. In either case, the 
neighbor changes its secret key and initiates the rekeying 
process. It sends the new keys to the members of its key as- 
sociation group and they are responsible for propagating the 
new keys to the appropriate members in their subgroups. In 
the rest of this section, we describe the ID update process 
followed by the rekeying process. 
d Root Key 
@ ,. 
Figure 3. Leave protocol 
Assuming that X is the departing node and Y (= Neigh- 
bor(X)) is its neighbor. If Y has the same ID length as 
X, Y right shifts its ID by one bit position to get its new 
ID. If Y’s ID is longer than that of X, X’s sibling and 
its descendants change their IDS as follows. Notice that 
each descendant Z of X’s sibling shares a key with X. If 
Z = bhbh- 1 . . . bi+l bibi-1 . . . bzbl, then Z ’ s  ID after the de- 
parture would be bhbh-l. . . bi+l bi- i . . . bzbi, where i is the 
difference in the length of Z’s and X’s IDS plus one. In 
both cases, Y generates the new secret key and initiates the 
rekeying. In Figure 3, if E leaves, F gets the ID 10 and gen- 
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erates a new secret key; if G leaves, H and I get the IDS 110, 
11 1 respectively and H generates the new secret key. 
In Figure 3, C leaves the multicast group. J notices the 
departure and changes its ID from 0101 to 010, and gen- 
erates a new secret key for itself. Consequently, internal 
node keys on J’s path to the root change and J is responsible 
for initiating key exchanges with its counterparts, 01 l(D), 
000(A) and 110(G) as defined earlier in this section. J sends 
the blinded key kklo to D. Both J and D can now compute 
kol . J then sends kb, to A, which is responsible for sharing 
it with all members who have kw. Finally, J sends kb to G 
which in turn sends kb to all the members that have kl . No- 
tice that J does not need any keys in return from D, A or 
G. It already has the blinded keys it needs to compute the 
root key. While the departing member C knows all those 
blinded keys as well, it does not know any unblinded keys 
it needs and thus cannot compute or acquire the root key. A 
departure results in O(logn) unicast messages and O(1ogn) 
multicast messages, each message carrying one encrypted 
secret key. In the following, we provide a generalization of 
the rekeying process after a member departs from the group. 
Algorithm 4: Leaving the multicast group 
Leave(X) 
begin 
Y = FindlVeighbor(X); 
foreach Z in {descendants(sibling(X))} U {Y} 
k? = generatemewkey(); 
computeinternalmodelceys(Y); 
i =  1; 
while (i 5 length(Y)) 
begin 
2 = delete_i‘h-bit(Z, length(2)-length(X)+ 1); 
(M, K‘) = Find-KeyAssociation(Y, i); 
sendkeyfrom-to(outgoingkey, Y, M); 
scoped..securemulticast(outgoingkey, M, K); 
I* M already has K *I 
i = i + l ;  
Outgoingkey = kiightshift(y,i-l); 
end 
end 
2.4. Secure data communication 
All members in the multicast group can compute the root 
key with the given keys. A member with data to send, en- 
crypts it with the root key and sends it via traditional mul- 
ticast channels (eg: MBONE). Other members can decrypt 
the data without any further key exchanges. Our protocol 
allows secure subgroup communication also. A sender may 
send secret data to a subgroup of members by encrypting 
the key it shares with the subgroup. 
3. DISEC compared to existing solutions for se- 
cure many-to-many group communication 
Secure one-to-many multicast protocols [l,  3, 10, 11, 121 
that pre-distribute the session key may claim that they sup- 
port multiple senders as well. However, they use a central- 
ized group controller which is a single point of failure and 
attack. In the presence of multiple senders, it is desirable 
to have the group operational as long as at least one of the 
senders is operational. Group control and key management 
tasks should be evenly distributed among all the senders. 
Only a few distributed group management protocols for 
secure many-to-many communication exist in the litera- 
ture [8, 9, IO]. Iolus [8] uses hierarchical subgrouping to 
delegate group control authority as well as key distribution 
overhead. A group security controller, a centralized entity, 
is assigned the responsibility of the security and operation 
of the group. Also, Iolus exposes secret keys to “trusted” 
third parties, which is a liability to the security of the sys- 
tem. Waldvogel et. al. proposed a distributed flat key 
management scheme (DFKM) which trusts all the members 
equally. In principle it conforms to the desirable character- 
istics of distributed group management. However, it is pos- 
sible in this protocol to have only a few senders controlling 
the operation of the group. Also, this scheme cannot avoid 
collusions and it is hard to detect them as well. Eliminat- 
ing colluding senders could require re-initiation of the en- 
tire group. Recently, Rodeh et. a1 [9] proposed a distributed 
group key management scheme using a logical hierarchy 
of keys (DLKH). This protocol assigns group control and 
management to a subset of the members, to avoid a single 
point of failure and attack. 
Table 1 compares the protocols that support many-to- 
many communication. In the table, CKM represents the 
centralized key distribution schemes. Note that while the 
flat schemes use less keys, they cannot avoid, detect or elim- 
inate collusions efficiently. 
4. Conclusion 
We propose a distributed key management scheme for 
many-to-many secure group communication. We use one- 
way function trees for key distribution and management. 
One-way function trees have been used in the cryptogra- 
phy literature for various purposes. Recently McGrew and 
Sherman [6] proposed the idea of using bottom-up one-way 
function trees (OFT) for secret key distribution in large dy- 
namic groups. DISEC uses one-way functions, but proposes 
a distributed solution to group key management. In the fol- 
lowing we summarize our contributions. 
0 Distributed ID assignment: DISEC proposes a local- 
ized ID assignment scheme thereby eliminating the 
697 
Authorized licensed use limited to: University of Nebraska - Lincoln. Downloaded on March 11,2010 at 21:06:54 EST from IEEE Xplore.  Restrictions apply. 
Criterion CKM lolus DFKM DLKH 
Group control Centralized 
Single point of failure Group Manager GSC No No 
Yes No Vulnerable to collusions 
Uses trusted third party entities No Yes No No 
Even distribution of control No No Not always No 
Distributed GSAs Distributed Distributed GSC Centralized 







ob) Tree-based O(n) Flat O(logn) No. of keys in the group 
need for a centralized group controller. We introduce 
the idea of key associations, which facilitates the del- 
egation of group management functions as well as key 
distribution overhead to all the senders. 
O(logn) O(n)  ob) 
Distributed group management: Each member gener- 
ates its own key thereby contributing a secret towards 
the computation of the root key. This property gives 
each member equal control over the group. It also en- 
sures that no proper subset of the group members can 
gain control of all the blinded and unblinded keys in 
the group. In OFT, the group manager needs to mon- 
itor all members of the group to detect unscheduled 
departures. In DISEC, neighbors monitor each other 
thereby avoiding global flooding of control traffic (ex- 
ample: heart-beat messages). 
No. of keys at a member 
No. of messages during a join 
No. of messages during a leave 
Scalable 
0 Scalability: DISEC supports secure group communica- 
tion between a large number of senders in a scal- 
able fashion. Key distribution overhead is distributed 
evenly among all the senders. Key associations ensure 
that each sender serves only O(1ogn) other senders 
which contributes to the scalability of the protocol. 
O(logn) O(1) O(logn) O(logn) ( W o g n )  
O(logn) ( 4 1 )  O(logn) O(logn) O(1ogn) 
O(logn) subgroup) O(logn) O(1ogn) O(1ogn) 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
O(Average size of a 
DISEC is a structured protocol in that each sender can 
determine the other senders it serves and the keys they need 
without having to exchange any control information. 
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